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RECENT CASES

attorney is the prosecution of all criminal cases within his county." It has
been clearly held that a states attorney can nol. pros. only with the consent of
the court, and that the court's discretion in this regard will not be reviewed
by mandamus." In the instant case the state's attorney had been unsuccessful in an attempt to nol. pros. He then requested the Attorney General to
etner the case and move to nol. pros. the indictment.
A West Virginia case, Denham v. Robinson,1: faced with an identical situation denied the power of the prosecuting attorney and-the Attorney General
to nol. pros. without the consent of the court holding that where the Attorney
General undertakes to exercise or control powers and duties of the prosecuting
attorneys, he is limited by the same rules of practice that control them. It is
submitted that the latter case forms the more logical rule. The states attorney,
who can nol. pros. only with consent of the trial court, should not be allowed
to do indirectly, that which he cannot do directly.
CECIL E. REINKE.
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OF FEDERAL OFFICER IN STATE PROSECUTION. Plaintiff sued in
a federal district court to enjoin a federal narcotics agent from testifying
against him in a state prosecution for violation of its narcotics law as to
evidence determined in a prior federal criminal prosecution to have been
illegally obtained. The former prosecution had been dismissed on motion of
the government because of the inadmissability of the evidence. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial by the lower court of the relief sought. On certiorari the Supreme Court, with four judges dissenting, reversed the ruling of
the Court of Appeals and held that the agent was subject to injunction. Rea
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956).
Since Weeks v. United States, federal courts have denied admission to
illegally obtained evidence.2 Prior to that case it was admissable.3 This prohibition, liowever, does not bar all illegally obtained evidence. If the evidence
was not obtained by federal officers, but by strangers4 or state officers, 5 it may
be admitted. Where it was obtained by federal officers through an illegal
search and seizure of a third person's property it may also be admitted. 6 The
objection to the evidence must be made promptly upon discovery of the fact
that it was obtained by illegal means, or else the right to object is deemed to
MONY

11. Il. Ann Stat. c. 14 § 5 (1951).
"The duty of each state's attorney shall be to
commence and prosecute all . . . indictments . . . in any court of record in his county
in which the people of the state or county may be concerned."
12. People cx rel. Hoyne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill.315, 120 N.E. 244 (1918).

13. 72 W. Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913).
1. 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
2. See Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255
U. S. 298 (1921); Silverthrone Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
3. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904); Hardesty v. United States, 164
Fed. 420 (6th Cir. 1908).
4. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1920); see Pederson v. United States, 271
Fed. 187 (2d Cir. 1921).
5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Rice v. United States, 251 Fed.
778 (1st Cir. 1918); United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed. 600 (N. D. Ohio 1921); United
States v. Burnside, 273 Fed: 603 (W. D. Wis. 1921).
6. Anderson v. United States, 273 Fed. 20 (8th Cir. 1921); Haywood v. United
States, 268 Fed. 795 (7th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 689 (1921); Tsuie Shee
v. Backus, 243 Fed. 551 (9th Cir. 1917).
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have been waived.7 Although there is a split of authority in regard to admissability in state courts, the majority admit illegally obtained evidence., This
rule is followed 'in New Mexico 9 and North Dakota.10
The theory that provided the basis for the decision in the instant case was
that the federal courts have a supervisory power over federal law enforcement
agencies, and it is their duty to police the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and enforce its obscivince.1t While the majority cite
for authority the case of McNabb v. United States,12 it is difficult to see how
that case can logically be precedent for this decision. The Supreme Court in
that case specifically stated that it was not concerned with law enforcement
practices except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of law
enforcement. 13
The majority also rely upon the case of Wise v. Henkel;' I In that case the
Supreme Court held that if goods had been illegally obtained by prosecuting
officers the court has inherent power to order the return of those goods. 15
li the court, in the instant case, had limited its order to the prohibition of the
use of the goods obtained Wise v. Henkel would have provided good authority.
A federal statute specifically provides that all property taken under any
revenue law of the United States shall be contraband subject to the orders
and decrees of the federal courts.1 6 The decision in the instant case appears
to be justifiable only as an extension of the holding of Wise v. Henkel.
One problem raised by the decision of the instant case involved that of
separation of powers, since here the judiciary in effect has regulated the action
of an employee of the executive branch of the government. This is the first
time, according to dissenting Justice Harlan, that the Supreme Court has declared that the federal courts share with the executive branch of the government responsibility for supervising law enforcement activities as such.17 Another interesting problem presented by this case is the conflict between the
state and federal authority. Although the majority decision states that by
issuing the requested injunction the District Court would not interfere with
state agencies in enforcement of the law,18 such a claim is of doubtful logic
because the effect of the order is to completely destroy the cause of action in
7. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954); Rose v. United States,
149 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1945); United States v. Wernecke, 138 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1943).
8. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1948); McCormick, Evidence, 291 (1954).
9. State v. Bell, 35 N. M. 96, 290 Pac. 739 (1930); State v. Watts, 35 N. M. 94,

290 Pac. 738 (1930); State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
10. State v. Lacy, 55 N. D. 83, 212 N.W. 442 (1927);

203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925).

State v. Fahn, 53 N. D.

11. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216, 217 (1956) ("[W]e have a case
that raises . . . a question . . . concerning our supervisory powers over federal law
enforcement agencies . . . The power of the federal courts extends to policing those
requirements and making certain that they. are observed.")
12. 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
13. Id. at 347. ("[W]e confine ourselves to our limited function as the court of ultimate
review of the standards, formulated and applied by federal courts in the trial of criminal
cases. We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts
themselves become instruments of law enforcement.")
14. 220 U. S. 556 (1911).
15. Id. at 558. ("[I]t was within the power of the court to take jurisdiction of the
subject of the return, and pass upon it, as the result of its inherent authority to consider
and decide questions arising before it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of
authority in connection with the execution of,the process of the court.")
16. 62 Stat. 974 (1948), 28 U. S. C. 1 2463 (1952).
17. See Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214, 218 (1956).
18. Id. at 216. ("The District Court is not asked to enjoin state officials nor in any
way to interfere with state agencies in enforcement of state law.")
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the state court. The Supreme Court said in StefaneUi v. Minarda that it
would not interfere in state criminal proceedings to suppress evidence illegally obtained because of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and state adminstration of its own
law.20
Another argument against the decision laid down in this case is that it
places additional restraints on federal law enforcement officials, thus making
the apprehension of criminals more difficult. It has been argued that, as in
the instant case, it would have the effect of releasing upon society criminals
that are known to be guilty.21
Despite the rather weak authority for the decision reached in .this case, it is
submitted that the results flowing from the decision should be beneficial. Some
feel that existing law does not provide sufficient protection from the arbitrary
and illegal acts of law enforcement officers.22 On the state level, suits against
a policeman are generally fruitless because of his financial condition, and the
municipality that hired the policeman is not liable because of governmental
23
immunity.
ROBERT L. ECKERT.

CONTRACTS - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE. - In
an action for specific performance of a contract for a sale of land brought by
the vendee against the administratrix of the deceased vendor, the defense of
intoxication of the vendor at the time of the execution of the contract was
asserted. The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff vendee and
denied defendant's motion for trial de novo. On appeal, the Supreme Court
ol North Dakota held that the judgment of the lower court was correct in
denying the defense of intoxication on the basis of the evidence presented.
Christiansonv. Larson, 77 N.W.2d 441 (N. D. 1956).
The early common law theory which provided that intoxication was no defense to the validity of a contract' has undergone a transformation so that
today most states hold that a contract entered into by a party "excessively"
intoxicated is voidable as to him. - What is meant by "excessive" intoxication
has apparently not been precisely defined, but the common conception is that
the intoxication must be so great as to deprive one of reason and understanding, thus rendering him incapable of comprehending the nature and consequences of his act.3 This excessive intoxication to be effective as a defense must
occur at the time the contract was executed. 4 The time within which excessive
19. 342 U. S. 117 (1951).
20. Id. at 120.
21. Comment, 42 Mich. L. 1Rev. 910 (1944)

(Such decisions tend to "handicap law

enforcement . . . and are . . . contrary to the public interest . . .")
22. Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal, 28-31 (1947).
23. Id. at 28, 29.

1. 2 Kent Comm. 451 (10th ed. 1860); Buch v. Breinig, 113 Pa. 310, 6 Ati. 86

(1886) (dictum).

2. E.g. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N.D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim,

14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905); In re Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 25 A.2d 811
(1942); Ex parte Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938).
3. Martin v. Harsh, 231 III. 384, 83 N.E. 614 (1907); Keedick v. Brogan, 116 Neb.
339, 217 N.W. 583 (1928); Renfeldt v. Brush-McWilliams Co., 45 N. D. 224, 176 N.W.
838 (1919); Harlow v. Kingston, 169 Wis. 521, 173 N.W. 308 (1919).
4. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); Simpson, Contracts 293

(1954).

